Veel meer lengte en kopkracht vooraan toen. En vooral aanvallers met een ander profiel.
Tactieken en systemen
Re: Tactieken en systemen
Ik hoop dat ge ironisch zijt?
Veel meer lengte en kopkracht vooraan toen. En vooral aanvallers met een ander profiel.
Veel meer lengte en kopkracht vooraan toen. En vooral aanvallers met een ander profiel.
Laatst gewijzigd door Peet op 12 sep 2016, 07:08, 1 keer totaal gewijzigd.
Re: Tactieken en systemen
Die kopkracht is maar bijzaak.Peet schreef: Ik hoop dat ge ironisch zijt?
Veel meer lengte en kopkracht vooraan toen. En vooral aanvallers met een ander profiel.
Het grote probleem zit hem volgens mij in:
Izquierdo/ Balaban
Refaelov/ Verheyen
Maar vooral
???/ Ceh
Je verliest op die drie posities de volledige kern van het systeem.
Edit/ Izquierdo kan je daar nog in passen. Een grote aanpassing is dat niet.
Vanaken moet eigenlijk de rol van Englebert overnemen in dat systeem. Wat je met Ceh zou doen weet ik gewoon absoluut niet.
Laatst gewijzigd door Khas op 12 sep 2016, 07:26, 2 keer totaal gewijzigd.
"Those who were dancing were thought to be stupid by those that could not hear the music."
Do what thou wilt, shall be the whole of the law.
Do what thou wilt, shall be the whole of the law.
Re: Tactieken en systemen
https://www.devoetbaltrainer.nl/2017/06 ... barcelona/" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Re: Tactieken en systemen
Interessante twitterthread met uitspraken van Xavi Hernández ivm tactiek en spelsystemen. Vergelijkingen tussen bijvoorbeeld Simeone en Guardiola, het belang van De Bruyne, waarom Ronaldo makkelijker te verdedigen valt dan Messi of Neymar, waarom het middenveld van Spanje meer talent heeft maar minder power dan dat van Duitsland, het verschil tussen Busquets en Casemiro, waarom hij vindt dat Barça Santi Cazorla in de rangen had moeten hebben, waarom hij LeBron James herkent in Lionel Messi et cetera.
De tweets komen van Juan Arango, maar als ik het goed begrijp zijn dit quotes uit een interview met Xavi dat werd afgenomen door Diego Torres, medewerker van El Pais.
In plaats van alle tweets hier te zetten, zet ik hier enkel de eerste tweet. Wie de thread op twitter wil lezen kan er op die manier dus aan geraken.
Voor de anderen heb ik uit alle tweets de tekst gecopy/pastet.
Ik kijk er alvast naar uit om Xavi aan het werk te zien als coach! Heeft duidelijk zijn vista behouden en houdt ervan te analyseren. Veelbelovend.
Xavi: “Football has become similar to (American) football. Nothing is left to chance. There was a point when if Guardiola went on vacation, the team knew what to do. The only thing you didn’t do was analyze the rival. Well, I did.”
“I believe that the coach’s role is a bit excessive at times. We’ve improved at a physical level that is it very difficult to dribble past defenders. Except for Messi and Neymar, for Suárez, Cristiano or Bale it is very difficult to get past a defender because of their form.”
“The tactical level has exploded. Guardiola focused on those details. He had everything controlled. I had never worked on a defensive throw-in. He would give orders even for that. We would be positioned for a throw in that we had to defend.”
“What has happened? Everyone is trying to Guardiola’s style to an extent. People like Löw observed us and he got to where he did. Some have copied us, whole others went for the antithesis, like @Simeone.”
“(At @Atleti) they have players like Kokedropped back, closing spaces, looking to neutralize superior qualities.”
“Football has exploited the physical and the tactical. Now what needs to be exploited is the technical aspect; why things happen, how to attack. That’s talent. ”
“(The technical aspect) is not sufficiently developed because in top level football there are more Simeones than Guardiolas.”
“That happens in the PL. How many teams play like Guardiola? Three, Four? How many play like Simeone? 70 percent. In La Liga the same thing happens. The excuse from many coaches is ‘I can’t compete with Barcelona or City’. But they play the same way against Leganés.”
“In the PL you are seeing itt more this season because Guardiola is dominating matches. They’ve said, “I will forget about the ball, I’m dropping back’. There is a lack of exploiting the dominance of play. There is a need to risk more.”
“If I am at a small club and play Barcelona I want to take the ball away from them. The question is, “how do I take the ball away from them?”
“Do I do it like Paco Jémez? I am going to press high? If you give them space ter Stegen passes to Piqué and he moves up to the midfield and for me that is a death announced.”
“We started to train on (reduced spaces) back in 2008. With Luis Enrique, the same thing. With two lines of four and another that marks the pivot man. We tried to look for spaces quickly by switching sides. Not playing one line, but changing to our 2nd or 3rd lines.”
“Barça knew what they were going to face. We worked in situations with nine defenders where our central defender had to conduct and divide always in reduced space looking to keep possession. Playing to position and establish control based on separating from a rival within 2-3m.”
“The Mourinho we faced at Madrid, played us directly to our backs. He would tell his players to not stop the ball. They would play quickly and would break out with Di María, Cristiano and Benzema. Now they do it with Bale, etc. They don’t want to play football.”
“DeBruyne and Silva have adapted to the midfield because that type of player knows how to set up at 360 degrees. They can move in both directions. They see the entire pitch. Because based on the the way Guardiola plays you need players down the wings, like Sané.”
“Sané would have a hard time playing inside. Because he does not have the capacity to dribble or to make the turn that creates space. That type of turn is made by Messi, Iniesta, Silva, De Bruyne or Gundogan and if you really push me, Sterling. Not Sané. He needs space.”
“Cristiano is another example. He can’t play in the middle. He doesn’t position himself well. @DeBruyneKev and Silva are spectacle to watch. it seems like just now we are discovering Silva.”
“Stimulate creativitity? With rondos. People still think that rondos are just to have fun. It is a great exercise- use both feet, look at the second line, make the inside pass, attract, attract and when you reel in the defender, boom, you pass to the other side.”
“Rondos have no limit. It’s an exercise that that allows infinite development. For example, 7v2 or 5v2... 9v2 is more lucid. Or you can do a rondo with three in the middle- two that press and the third that drops back and you have to see where there is space.”
“ @RealMadrid gets fractured. Seven go on the attack and @Casemiro is then all alone covering the middle of the pitch. This is heads or tails. Busquets can’t do this because even I am faster than Busquets. Casemiro is super fast.”
“Casemiro is super fast, but everything else is more difficult for him because it wasn’t worked with him. He has another characteristic- he is more defensive. He steals balls. He gets there first. He takes up more space in the midfield, But he doesn’t dominate time and space.”
“If Casemiro were stimulated that way at 12, 13, 15, he’d have those qualities. Why does Madrid have Kroos? Because that was worked with him when he was in Germany. @Thiago6 ? Because he was at (La Masía).”
“The shocking part, how does @19SCazorla have it? You ask him and he says, “I was developed in Avilés, at @RealOviedo and then went to @recreoficial. That’s innate talent.”
“I ask myself why didn’t @FCBarcelona ever sign (@19SCazorla) ... players like Silva, @ToniKroos @lm19official ... why didn’t Barça sign them? Those are players that fit the profile there.”
(Guardiola’s football) is associative. He’s always trying to figure out where the empty space will be. If you play against @LevanteUD , you know that their wingers will man mark your fullbacks. If their winger follows your fullback, the space is there for your winger.”
Bielsa used to do that. He would place the fullback towards the middle. It created space for your winger. Because sometimes that fullback interrupts the pass from a Piqué to a Messi. It gets interrupted because the winger now doesn’t want that pass to come through.”
“So if they man mark, you bring in a Zabaleta or Walker on the inside, if the opposing winger doesn’t follow, he’s unmarked and if he follows, there’s a pass out wide. Space and time. This is uncontrollable for a rival.”
“Guardiola is doing different things (at City). He works the defense based on the wide crosses. He discovers who is making the crosses and he places people in front of the players that are going to receive those crosses.”
“Messi knows that he has a player marking him. But he also know that he’s afraid of him, so he waits for the second defender to come in. Just when he has a 3v1, that’s when he passes. I saw this same quality in @KingJames.”
“ @KingJames is not just good individually, when he was double-teamed, he would find the open man that could make a three. This is what Messi and @andresiniesta8 can do. They bring you in until there is a player freed up.”
“If a player is not freed up, let’s play. We’ve been working on this since we were kids. We learned where to figure out where there was the free man and where there was space. Even ter Stegen knows is. Even he trains knowing that.”
“When @FCBayern came to Camp Nou, they man marked us, but left ter Stegen alone. He then would pass the ball to @LuisSuarez9 and it was a 3v3.”
“I believe that the majority of footballers don’t step onto the pitch to do sprints. What do they do? They touch the ball. We play football because the ball is our vice.”
“Brazil have recovered. They have a tremendous team. They have two things- talent and physical capability. That is difficult. That’s why @SeFutbol has so much merit. Because they won with barely any physical qualities, with maybe the exception of @SergioRamos Arbeloa, Puyol”
“ #Spain above all have talent. There is no midfield in the world like that one. There is no Silva. Is there a better player than Silva? There isn’t. Better than Iniesta? No. Better than Busquets? Those are players that carry the weight of the team.”
“Spain might have more physical attributes now, but they can’t compete with Germany there. Spain has to compete on talent.”
“Barça and Madrid are two demanding crowds. Difference is that at the Bernabéu they can’t stand laziness.. Their reference is the spirit of Juanito. Juanito or the spirit of Camacho are part of the culture at Madrid.”
“What is Barcelona’s culture? It is not the Víctor Múñoz or Calderé culture. Barcelona’s culture is that of Cruyff. Cruyff turned, looked, understood the game. He never lost that.” #FCBLive
"Neymar is an incredible leader. He's tremendous on the pitch. He has the type of personality that he does not fear anything. That is a virtue. This is what differentiates a great footballer. In the most difficult moments he says, 'give me the ball'."
"What happened at Barça was that when things were complicated, we all wanted the ball. Everyone had personality. What happened to @PSG_inside and @ManCity in recent years? They had competed with players who weren't accustomed to that weight."
"Now you see @PSG_English and, damn, you see Cavani, Di María, Verratti... they have lifted trophies. They have been there. Neymar gets mad when he doesn't get the ball. That is a great."
"I believe that there will be a time after Cristiano and Messi that Neymar will be the reference. He's Brazilian and Brazil has what it takes to get to the World Cup final. There will be a Neymar era that will last three or four seasons. They will will be @KMbappe"
"@KMbappe has tremendous potential. He's just 19 and he's a beast. I think talent is greater than physicality, Neymar is like Messi- talent and physicality. I think Mbappe has more physicality than talent. And how I see it players make a difference on talent over physicality."
"If you put @KMbappe at Barça, that kid will improve. He will understand everything. If a coach like Guardiola gets him at 8.5, he will make him a 9.5. @neymarjr is already a 9.5."
"Mbappé has to improve on a lot of things, especially when it comes to understanding the game. When he was a youth player, he didn't have to think. All he had to do was make the play based on strength and velocity. I want to see him face a defense like @atleti."
"All I can say is that right now, @neymarjr is the best."
----------
EDIT/ Het volledige artikel, in het Spaans:
https://elpais.com/deportes/2018/01/08/ ... 50263.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
De tweets komen van Juan Arango, maar als ik het goed begrijp zijn dit quotes uit een interview met Xavi dat werd afgenomen door Diego Torres, medewerker van El Pais.
In plaats van alle tweets hier te zetten, zet ik hier enkel de eerste tweet. Wie de thread op twitter wil lezen kan er op die manier dus aan geraken.
Voor de anderen heb ik uit alle tweets de tekst gecopy/pastet.
Ik kijk er alvast naar uit om Xavi aan het werk te zien als coach! Heeft duidelijk zijn vista behouden en houdt ervan te analyseren. Veelbelovend.
Xavi: “Football has become similar to (American) football. Nothing is left to chance. There was a point when if Guardiola went on vacation, the team knew what to do. The only thing you didn’t do was analyze the rival. Well, I did.”
“I believe that the coach’s role is a bit excessive at times. We’ve improved at a physical level that is it very difficult to dribble past defenders. Except for Messi and Neymar, for Suárez, Cristiano or Bale it is very difficult to get past a defender because of their form.”
“The tactical level has exploded. Guardiola focused on those details. He had everything controlled. I had never worked on a defensive throw-in. He would give orders even for that. We would be positioned for a throw in that we had to defend.”
“What has happened? Everyone is trying to Guardiola’s style to an extent. People like Löw observed us and he got to where he did. Some have copied us, whole others went for the antithesis, like @Simeone.”
“(At @Atleti) they have players like Kokedropped back, closing spaces, looking to neutralize superior qualities.”
“Football has exploited the physical and the tactical. Now what needs to be exploited is the technical aspect; why things happen, how to attack. That’s talent. ”
“(The technical aspect) is not sufficiently developed because in top level football there are more Simeones than Guardiolas.”
“That happens in the PL. How many teams play like Guardiola? Three, Four? How many play like Simeone? 70 percent. In La Liga the same thing happens. The excuse from many coaches is ‘I can’t compete with Barcelona or City’. But they play the same way against Leganés.”
“In the PL you are seeing itt more this season because Guardiola is dominating matches. They’ve said, “I will forget about the ball, I’m dropping back’. There is a lack of exploiting the dominance of play. There is a need to risk more.”
“If I am at a small club and play Barcelona I want to take the ball away from them. The question is, “how do I take the ball away from them?”
“Do I do it like Paco Jémez? I am going to press high? If you give them space ter Stegen passes to Piqué and he moves up to the midfield and for me that is a death announced.”
“We started to train on (reduced spaces) back in 2008. With Luis Enrique, the same thing. With two lines of four and another that marks the pivot man. We tried to look for spaces quickly by switching sides. Not playing one line, but changing to our 2nd or 3rd lines.”
“Barça knew what they were going to face. We worked in situations with nine defenders where our central defender had to conduct and divide always in reduced space looking to keep possession. Playing to position and establish control based on separating from a rival within 2-3m.”
“The Mourinho we faced at Madrid, played us directly to our backs. He would tell his players to not stop the ball. They would play quickly and would break out with Di María, Cristiano and Benzema. Now they do it with Bale, etc. They don’t want to play football.”
“DeBruyne and Silva have adapted to the midfield because that type of player knows how to set up at 360 degrees. They can move in both directions. They see the entire pitch. Because based on the the way Guardiola plays you need players down the wings, like Sané.”
“Sané would have a hard time playing inside. Because he does not have the capacity to dribble or to make the turn that creates space. That type of turn is made by Messi, Iniesta, Silva, De Bruyne or Gundogan and if you really push me, Sterling. Not Sané. He needs space.”
“Cristiano is another example. He can’t play in the middle. He doesn’t position himself well. @DeBruyneKev and Silva are spectacle to watch. it seems like just now we are discovering Silva.”
“Stimulate creativitity? With rondos. People still think that rondos are just to have fun. It is a great exercise- use both feet, look at the second line, make the inside pass, attract, attract and when you reel in the defender, boom, you pass to the other side.”
“Rondos have no limit. It’s an exercise that that allows infinite development. For example, 7v2 or 5v2... 9v2 is more lucid. Or you can do a rondo with three in the middle- two that press and the third that drops back and you have to see where there is space.”
“ @RealMadrid gets fractured. Seven go on the attack and @Casemiro is then all alone covering the middle of the pitch. This is heads or tails. Busquets can’t do this because even I am faster than Busquets. Casemiro is super fast.”
“Casemiro is super fast, but everything else is more difficult for him because it wasn’t worked with him. He has another characteristic- he is more defensive. He steals balls. He gets there first. He takes up more space in the midfield, But he doesn’t dominate time and space.”
“If Casemiro were stimulated that way at 12, 13, 15, he’d have those qualities. Why does Madrid have Kroos? Because that was worked with him when he was in Germany. @Thiago6 ? Because he was at (La Masía).”
“The shocking part, how does @19SCazorla have it? You ask him and he says, “I was developed in Avilés, at @RealOviedo and then went to @recreoficial. That’s innate talent.”
“I ask myself why didn’t @FCBarcelona ever sign (@19SCazorla) ... players like Silva, @ToniKroos @lm19official ... why didn’t Barça sign them? Those are players that fit the profile there.”
(Guardiola’s football) is associative. He’s always trying to figure out where the empty space will be. If you play against @LevanteUD , you know that their wingers will man mark your fullbacks. If their winger follows your fullback, the space is there for your winger.”
Bielsa used to do that. He would place the fullback towards the middle. It created space for your winger. Because sometimes that fullback interrupts the pass from a Piqué to a Messi. It gets interrupted because the winger now doesn’t want that pass to come through.”
“So if they man mark, you bring in a Zabaleta or Walker on the inside, if the opposing winger doesn’t follow, he’s unmarked and if he follows, there’s a pass out wide. Space and time. This is uncontrollable for a rival.”
“Guardiola is doing different things (at City). He works the defense based on the wide crosses. He discovers who is making the crosses and he places people in front of the players that are going to receive those crosses.”
“Messi knows that he has a player marking him. But he also know that he’s afraid of him, so he waits for the second defender to come in. Just when he has a 3v1, that’s when he passes. I saw this same quality in @KingJames.”
“ @KingJames is not just good individually, when he was double-teamed, he would find the open man that could make a three. This is what Messi and @andresiniesta8 can do. They bring you in until there is a player freed up.”
“If a player is not freed up, let’s play. We’ve been working on this since we were kids. We learned where to figure out where there was the free man and where there was space. Even ter Stegen knows is. Even he trains knowing that.”
“When @FCBayern came to Camp Nou, they man marked us, but left ter Stegen alone. He then would pass the ball to @LuisSuarez9 and it was a 3v3.”
“I believe that the majority of footballers don’t step onto the pitch to do sprints. What do they do? They touch the ball. We play football because the ball is our vice.”
“Brazil have recovered. They have a tremendous team. They have two things- talent and physical capability. That is difficult. That’s why @SeFutbol has so much merit. Because they won with barely any physical qualities, with maybe the exception of @SergioRamos Arbeloa, Puyol”
“ #Spain above all have talent. There is no midfield in the world like that one. There is no Silva. Is there a better player than Silva? There isn’t. Better than Iniesta? No. Better than Busquets? Those are players that carry the weight of the team.”
“Spain might have more physical attributes now, but they can’t compete with Germany there. Spain has to compete on talent.”
“Barça and Madrid are two demanding crowds. Difference is that at the Bernabéu they can’t stand laziness.. Their reference is the spirit of Juanito. Juanito or the spirit of Camacho are part of the culture at Madrid.”
“What is Barcelona’s culture? It is not the Víctor Múñoz or Calderé culture. Barcelona’s culture is that of Cruyff. Cruyff turned, looked, understood the game. He never lost that.” #FCBLive
"Neymar is an incredible leader. He's tremendous on the pitch. He has the type of personality that he does not fear anything. That is a virtue. This is what differentiates a great footballer. In the most difficult moments he says, 'give me the ball'."
"What happened at Barça was that when things were complicated, we all wanted the ball. Everyone had personality. What happened to @PSG_inside and @ManCity in recent years? They had competed with players who weren't accustomed to that weight."
"Now you see @PSG_English and, damn, you see Cavani, Di María, Verratti... they have lifted trophies. They have been there. Neymar gets mad when he doesn't get the ball. That is a great."
"I believe that there will be a time after Cristiano and Messi that Neymar will be the reference. He's Brazilian and Brazil has what it takes to get to the World Cup final. There will be a Neymar era that will last three or four seasons. They will will be @KMbappe"
"@KMbappe has tremendous potential. He's just 19 and he's a beast. I think talent is greater than physicality, Neymar is like Messi- talent and physicality. I think Mbappe has more physicality than talent. And how I see it players make a difference on talent over physicality."
"If you put @KMbappe at Barça, that kid will improve. He will understand everything. If a coach like Guardiola gets him at 8.5, he will make him a 9.5. @neymarjr is already a 9.5."
"Mbappé has to improve on a lot of things, especially when it comes to understanding the game. When he was a youth player, he didn't have to think. All he had to do was make the play based on strength and velocity. I want to see him face a defense like @atleti."
"All I can say is that right now, @neymarjr is the best."
----------
EDIT/ Het volledige artikel, in het Spaans:
https://elpais.com/deportes/2018/01/08/ ... 50263.html" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Laatst gewijzigd door Cedrinho op 09 jan 2018, 23:12, 2 keer totaal gewijzigd.
Re: Tactieken en systemen
En nu staat een groot deel van dat interview in SVM natuurlijk. Al mijn moeite voor niks 
Laatst gewijzigd door Cedrinho op 26 jan 2018, 16:09, 2 keer totaal gewijzigd.
Re: Tactieken en systemen
Uit Voetbal International:
Deze Argentijn veroorzaakte een wereldwijde opbouwrevolutie
Ricardo La Volpe viert dinsdag zijn 66ste verjaardag. De Argentijnse trainer kan in Europa moeiteloos anoniem over straat, maar toch kan iedere voetballiefhebber zijn opbouwvariant dromen. Over middenvelders die de bal komen halen tussen de centrale verdedigers.
Op een mooie zomeravond in juni kruipt een columnist van de Spaanse krant El Pais steeds dichter naar zijn scherm. Daar ziet de argeloze toeschouwer Mexico tijdens zijn eerste groepswedstrijd van het WK 2006 worstelen met voetbalkleinduimpje Iran. Deze ex-voetballer ziet echter een wedstrijd ontspinnen die zijn hart sneller doet kloppen. 'Het voetbal van het elftal van Ricardo Lavolpe was ontmoedigend, maar hij was vastbesloten om zich terug te vechten. Dat is de spirit! La Volpe kreeg de gelegenheid om dingen te veranderen. Zodat de spelers en de bal tegelijkertijd naar voren bewegen op het veld. Dat is de enige manier waarop je kan opbouwen. Je moet het samen doen. Net zoals met je vriendjes op het pleintje.'
De complimenten aan de Mexicaanse bondscoach La Volpe komen uit de pen van Pep Guardiola, die zich op dat moment aan het voorbereiden is op zijn trainersloopbaan. In het seizoen voorafgaande aan het WK speelde hij voor Dorados in Mexico, zodat hij het vak kon leren van Juanma Lillo. 'Toen ik daar was, vertelden ze me dat La Volpe op een zeer gestructureerde manier het juiste gedrag bij zijn verdedigers stimuleert op de training. Ze moeten langzaam opschuiven, samen met de bal. Keer op keer. Steeds opnieuw. Of La Volpe legt uit dat het veld niet opgerekt moet worden als een elastiek. Of hij vertelt dat de bal niet terug mag naar de keeper als hij ook voorwaarts gespeeeld kan worden. Bij de kleinste fout begint hij de oefening helemaal opnieuw. Dit gebeurt honderden keren in dertig minuten tijd. Totdat de verdedigers vrienden zijn met de bal.'
De ideeën van La Volpe over de opbouw zijn bijzonder gestructureerd. De door hem toegepaste variant heeft zelfs een eigen naam gekregen: Salida Lavolopiana. Snel vertaald: de uitweg van La Volpe. In Mexico speelt vrijwel ieder team op deze manier, hoewel de 66-jarige Argentijn al meer dan tien jaar geen bondscoach meer is.
Via Guardiola doen de ideeën van La Volpe hun intrede op de Europese voetbalvelden. Neem de bovenstaande situatie uit de legendarische 5-0 overwinning van Barcelona op Real Madrid in 2010. De positionering van de Catalanen komt exact uit het boekje van La Volpe.
Om te begrijpen wat er exact gebeurt, lopen we de door La Volpe voorgeschreven bewegingen stap voor stap door:
1. De twee centrale verdedigers gaan breed staan en de centrale middenvelder zakt uit in de ruimte tussen hen. Dit moet ertoe leiden dat de aanvallers van de tegenstanders gedwongen worden om minder dicht bij elkaar te spelen.
2. Om de onderlinge afstanden te bewaken, schuiven de middenvelders en backs verder op naar voren. Zo worden de voorwaardes gecreëerd om met een splijtende pass over de grond de linies van de tegenstander te doorbreken.
3. De aanvallers anticiperen op de loopacties van de spelers in de middelste linie. In de oorspronkelijke variant van La Volpe komen de buitenspelers in dit geval naar binnen, om een overtal te veroorzaken in de as. Vanwege de individuele kwaliteiten van zijn elftal komt Guardiola bij Barcelona tot een andere optie. Dani Alves schuift bijvoorbeeld verder door dan Eric Abidal aan de andere kant, wat te maken heeft met de offensieve wapens van de Braziliaanse rechtsback. In plaats van buitenspelers Pedro of David Villa is het spits Lionel Messi die naar het middenveld komt.
Het beoogde resultaat is uiteindelijk hetzelfde: de voorwaarden worden gecreëerd om als elftal met de bal progressie te maken. Dat valt het best te begrijpen door terug te keren naar de situatie waarmee we begonnen.
Door het uitzakken van Sergio Busquets lukt het Real Madrid niet om met de aanvallers druk uit te voeren op de man aan de bal. De rood omcirkelde situatie laat zien wat het effect is van het doorschuiven van Dani Alves. Linksbuiten Ángel Di María wordt hierdoor ver teruggedrongen. Daarnaast worden de twee centrale verdedigers van Real Madrid geïsoleerd doordat Messi is uitgezakt. Dit leidt tot een overtal voor Barcelona in de zwart omlijnde centrale zone op het middenveld.
Tijdens het toernooi om de Confederations Cup van afgelopen zomer speelt Mexico volgens dezelfde principes als tijdens het WK 2006. Dat gebeurt vanuit een 4-3-3-formatie met de punt naar achteren (zoals tegen Portugal en Rusland), of met een 3-4-3-formatie met een ruit op het middenveld (zoals tegen Nieuw-Zeeland). In beide gevallen maken de centrale verdedigers in de opbouw het veld breed, probeert een centrale pion zich tussen hen aanspeelbaar te maken en schuiven de backs en middenvelders door.
Doordat Guardiola de ideeën van La Volpe van Mexico (waar hij in 2005/06 zijn actieve loopbaan afsluit en kennismaakt met nieuwe opbouwvarianten) naar Europa brengt, wint de Salida Lavolpiana door kopieergedrag snel aan populariteit. Van Spanje tot Engeland en van Duitsland tot Nederland: overal is de middenvelder die in de opbouw uitzakt tussen zijn centrale verdedigers een bekend fenomeen. Zoals de driemansdefensie eveneens aan terrein wint.
Natuurlijk valt dit niet allemaal toe te schrijven aan La Volpe. In het voetbal is weinig écht nieuw en zijn de meeste innovaties nieuwe verschijningsvormen van een oud idee, maar de theorie van La Volpe is desondanks bij trainers over de hele wereld bekend. Dat is niet gek voor een trainer waarvan de prijzenkast bestaat uit één kampioenschap in Mexico en één Gold Cup.
Drie filmpjes waarin de opbouw van La Volpe wordt uitgelegd:
Deze Argentijn veroorzaakte een wereldwijde opbouwrevolutie
Ricardo La Volpe viert dinsdag zijn 66ste verjaardag. De Argentijnse trainer kan in Europa moeiteloos anoniem over straat, maar toch kan iedere voetballiefhebber zijn opbouwvariant dromen. Over middenvelders die de bal komen halen tussen de centrale verdedigers.
Op een mooie zomeravond in juni kruipt een columnist van de Spaanse krant El Pais steeds dichter naar zijn scherm. Daar ziet de argeloze toeschouwer Mexico tijdens zijn eerste groepswedstrijd van het WK 2006 worstelen met voetbalkleinduimpje Iran. Deze ex-voetballer ziet echter een wedstrijd ontspinnen die zijn hart sneller doet kloppen. 'Het voetbal van het elftal van Ricardo Lavolpe was ontmoedigend, maar hij was vastbesloten om zich terug te vechten. Dat is de spirit! La Volpe kreeg de gelegenheid om dingen te veranderen. Zodat de spelers en de bal tegelijkertijd naar voren bewegen op het veld. Dat is de enige manier waarop je kan opbouwen. Je moet het samen doen. Net zoals met je vriendjes op het pleintje.'
De complimenten aan de Mexicaanse bondscoach La Volpe komen uit de pen van Pep Guardiola, die zich op dat moment aan het voorbereiden is op zijn trainersloopbaan. In het seizoen voorafgaande aan het WK speelde hij voor Dorados in Mexico, zodat hij het vak kon leren van Juanma Lillo. 'Toen ik daar was, vertelden ze me dat La Volpe op een zeer gestructureerde manier het juiste gedrag bij zijn verdedigers stimuleert op de training. Ze moeten langzaam opschuiven, samen met de bal. Keer op keer. Steeds opnieuw. Of La Volpe legt uit dat het veld niet opgerekt moet worden als een elastiek. Of hij vertelt dat de bal niet terug mag naar de keeper als hij ook voorwaarts gespeeeld kan worden. Bij de kleinste fout begint hij de oefening helemaal opnieuw. Dit gebeurt honderden keren in dertig minuten tijd. Totdat de verdedigers vrienden zijn met de bal.'
De ideeën van La Volpe over de opbouw zijn bijzonder gestructureerd. De door hem toegepaste variant heeft zelfs een eigen naam gekregen: Salida Lavolopiana. Snel vertaald: de uitweg van La Volpe. In Mexico speelt vrijwel ieder team op deze manier, hoewel de 66-jarige Argentijn al meer dan tien jaar geen bondscoach meer is.
Via Guardiola doen de ideeën van La Volpe hun intrede op de Europese voetbalvelden. Neem de bovenstaande situatie uit de legendarische 5-0 overwinning van Barcelona op Real Madrid in 2010. De positionering van de Catalanen komt exact uit het boekje van La Volpe.
Om te begrijpen wat er exact gebeurt, lopen we de door La Volpe voorgeschreven bewegingen stap voor stap door:
1. De twee centrale verdedigers gaan breed staan en de centrale middenvelder zakt uit in de ruimte tussen hen. Dit moet ertoe leiden dat de aanvallers van de tegenstanders gedwongen worden om minder dicht bij elkaar te spelen.
2. Om de onderlinge afstanden te bewaken, schuiven de middenvelders en backs verder op naar voren. Zo worden de voorwaardes gecreëerd om met een splijtende pass over de grond de linies van de tegenstander te doorbreken.
3. De aanvallers anticiperen op de loopacties van de spelers in de middelste linie. In de oorspronkelijke variant van La Volpe komen de buitenspelers in dit geval naar binnen, om een overtal te veroorzaken in de as. Vanwege de individuele kwaliteiten van zijn elftal komt Guardiola bij Barcelona tot een andere optie. Dani Alves schuift bijvoorbeeld verder door dan Eric Abidal aan de andere kant, wat te maken heeft met de offensieve wapens van de Braziliaanse rechtsback. In plaats van buitenspelers Pedro of David Villa is het spits Lionel Messi die naar het middenveld komt.
Het beoogde resultaat is uiteindelijk hetzelfde: de voorwaarden worden gecreëerd om als elftal met de bal progressie te maken. Dat valt het best te begrijpen door terug te keren naar de situatie waarmee we begonnen.
Door het uitzakken van Sergio Busquets lukt het Real Madrid niet om met de aanvallers druk uit te voeren op de man aan de bal. De rood omcirkelde situatie laat zien wat het effect is van het doorschuiven van Dani Alves. Linksbuiten Ángel Di María wordt hierdoor ver teruggedrongen. Daarnaast worden de twee centrale verdedigers van Real Madrid geïsoleerd doordat Messi is uitgezakt. Dit leidt tot een overtal voor Barcelona in de zwart omlijnde centrale zone op het middenveld.
Dat is precies de bedoeling van de filosofie van La Volpe: door het bezetten van bepaalde ruimtes worden elders op het veld ruimtes gecreëerd. De bal wordt vervolgens richting die vrijgekomen ruimte gespeeld en dan schuift het hele elftal mee op naar voren. Net zoals vroeger op het pleintje, zoals Guardiola het omschrijft.Pep Guardiola over Salida Lavolpiana schreef: "De start met drie mannen van achteren is erg goed omdat je de druk van de tegenstander aanpast. Hoewel ze je met twee man onder druk zetten (een aanvaller en een nummer tien), dwing je ze als je met drie man opbouwt om parallel te lopen, in 4-4-2, en daar ga je overheen."
Tijdens het toernooi om de Confederations Cup van afgelopen zomer speelt Mexico volgens dezelfde principes als tijdens het WK 2006. Dat gebeurt vanuit een 4-3-3-formatie met de punt naar achteren (zoals tegen Portugal en Rusland), of met een 3-4-3-formatie met een ruit op het middenveld (zoals tegen Nieuw-Zeeland). In beide gevallen maken de centrale verdedigers in de opbouw het veld breed, probeert een centrale pion zich tussen hen aanspeelbaar te maken en schuiven de backs en middenvelders door.
Doordat Guardiola de ideeën van La Volpe van Mexico (waar hij in 2005/06 zijn actieve loopbaan afsluit en kennismaakt met nieuwe opbouwvarianten) naar Europa brengt, wint de Salida Lavolpiana door kopieergedrag snel aan populariteit. Van Spanje tot Engeland en van Duitsland tot Nederland: overal is de middenvelder die in de opbouw uitzakt tussen zijn centrale verdedigers een bekend fenomeen. Zoals de driemansdefensie eveneens aan terrein wint.
Natuurlijk valt dit niet allemaal toe te schrijven aan La Volpe. In het voetbal is weinig écht nieuw en zijn de meeste innovaties nieuwe verschijningsvormen van een oud idee, maar de theorie van La Volpe is desondanks bij trainers over de hele wereld bekend. Dat is niet gek voor een trainer waarvan de prijzenkast bestaat uit één kampioenschap in Mexico en één Gold Cup.
Drie filmpjes waarin de opbouw van La Volpe wordt uitgelegd:
Re: Tactieken en systemen
Interessant!
Re: Tactieken en systemen
How Lionel Messi and Wayne Rooney think on the field
One freezing night this January, I was sitting in the Camp Nou with a Barcelona official, watching Barca-Atletico Madrid in the Spanish Cup. When the game kicked off, the official said, "Watch Messi."
It was a puzzling sight. The little man was wandering around, apparently ignoring the ball. The official explained: "In the first few minutes he just walks across the field. He is looking at each opponent, where the guy positions himself, and how their defense fits together. Only after doing that does he start to play."
The stats tell the story. Messi has never scored in the first two minutes of a match. All his 442 goals for club and country came after that. Moreover, his career haul for the third and fourth minutes combined is a meager three strikes. Admittedly the opening minutes of most matches are pretty closed. However, Messi in this period is scoring at less than one-sixth of his normal rate. Instead, he spends the time doing an on-field analysis.
This points to a truth that we often miss amid the frenzy of top-class soccer: It's a thinking game, much less spontaneous than it looks. Even apparently instinctive creators and goal scorers like Messi are forever making calculations, often very conscious ones. To understand today's soccer, you need to grasp these conscious thought processes.
We are getting used to the idea that defensive players tend to move around in patterns dictated by their coaches, almost like in American gridiron football. This is becoming truer as soccer clubs employ growing tribes of video and match analysts to study opponents.
The consequence is that players for big teams now enter matches thoroughly briefed on what to do. Months before the World Cup in Brazil began, every man in the German squad had access to an app on which the team's many analysts would post useful videos. Before the France-Germany quarterfinal, the analysts emphasized one video in particular: an apparently unremarkable scene of the Dutchman Daley Blind tracking his opponent in a Holland-Germany under-21s match in 2013.
You watch the video and forget it almost instantly: The German attack peters out, with the Dutch keeper easily picking up a low pass. But that's because Blind was doing something crucial: After two German players attempted a one-two pass, he didn't follow the ball but kept running with the German who had started the move, staying with him until the attack was dead.
It was exactly the right thing to do. The German analysts expected Blind's defensive ploy to be especially important against the French, whose soccer culture traditionally favors one-twos. The German players studied Blind, and then did as he did. They shut out the previously impressive French 1-0.
Before the semifinal against Brazil and the final against Argentina -- two other countries that like one-twos -- the players watched the Blind video again. When the German FA's chief data analyst Chris Clemens told this story to the Dutch journalist Michiel de Hoog, he even suggested a headline for his article: "How Daley Blind saved Germany's World Cup."
That's the pre-planned nature of modern defending. But for creative players, planning and thinking work rather differently. You can't tell them how to beat a man. However, the best ones, like Messi, do the thinking for themselves. Even when surrounded by opponents in high-speed situations when a normal person would have to rely entirely on instinct, they think fast enough to process data in their minds.
In 2004, Carlos Queiroz, then coach of Real Madrid's Galacticos, told the author John Carlin how great players see on-field situations. "Imagine two cars colliding. For us it happens at normal speed," Queiroz said. "They see it in slow motion. They catch a lot more details in the same time as us. They can compute in their minds more details than you and I can see.
"Therefore they have more time than others. The great ones see the game in slow motion, but really it is in normal time."
If you can see the field, you can see the openings. The longtime director of AC Milan's "Milan Lab," the Belgian doctor Jean Paul Meersseman, told me that this quality of "sensory perception," "interpreting detail inside the brain," may be the most important in soccer. It matters more than any physical gifts. When I asked Meersseman who had it, he named the Brazilian Ronaldo: "He can perceive situations so fast and react to it, it's just amazing."
In part, great players can do this because they have imagined the situation long before it happens. This is the psychological technique of visualization. Look at how Diego Maradona, in his autobiography, describes his famous dribbled goal against England in 1986. He starts by saying, "The goal was a kid's dream." In other words, he had visualized it for years in advance.
Then, even while he was dribbling through half the England team, he was watching his teammate Jorge Valdano make a run to the far post. Maradona kept meaning to pass to him, but the moment was never quite right, and in the end he found that he had beaten everyone including the keeper, so he just scored. In short: In his mind, things were happening so slowly that he could keep one eye on Valdano.
Lastly, at some point after the goal Maradona recalled something his brother Hugo, nicknamed "El Turco," or "The Turk," had told him after a game in 1981, when Maradona had dribbled through the Scotland team but then shot against the keeper. "Idiot!" El Turco had chided him over the phone. He told Maradona he ought to have dribbled around the keeper. Five years later against England, that piece of advice was lodged somewhere in Maradona's brain, ready for use.
Wayne Rooney -- often wrongly derided as not the smartest person -- consciously visualizes. "Part of my preparation," he told the writer David Winner for ESPN The Magazine in 2012, "is I go and ask the kit man what colour we're wearing, if it's red top, white shorts, white socks or black socks. Then I lie in bed the night before the game and visualize myself scoring goals or doing well. You're trying to put yourself in that moment and trying to prepare yourself, to have a 'memory' before the game. I don't know if you'd call it visualizing or dreaming but I've always done it, my whole life."
The best players tend to have an exceptional visual memory. That enables Messi to store his observations about opposing defenders. Schalke 04's Dutch center-forward Klaas Jan Huntelaar, whom Louis van Gaal once called "the best striker in the world in the 'sixteen,'" that is, in the penalty area, can describe in exquisite detail opponents' positions on goals he scored years before. Huntelaar told me he usually didn't shoot on instinct. "The moment when I shoot, I reason through my position." Sometimes he will have observed that a keeper is weaker going to one side, or that a defender is easier to beat on his right than his left. All that information will go into Huntelaar's shot. When I remarked that it sounded as if he had his own personal GPS system, he joked: "Yes, it's in the back of my head."
What players like Huntelaar are doing is conscious but almost impossibly rapid decision-making. If you are a player in scoring position in a big game, teammates and opponents are moving in different directions around you. You have to estimate where everyone will be in 0.1 seconds from now, and then again in one second, make your decision accordingly, and then execute it in a tiny space with almost no margin for error.
It's like a combination of chess and NASCAR racing. If great players make their decisions look instinctive, that's only because their pace of thought is so rapid. Rooney said to Winner: "After the game, mentally you're tired as well. Your mind has been through so much. There's so many decisions you have to make through your head, and then you're trying to calculate other people's decisions as well. It's probably more mentally tiring than physically, to be honest."
Messi and Rooney are not scintillating conversationalists. But appearances deceive. In truth they are among the sharpest thinkers around.
BRON/ http://www.espn.com/soccer/blog/espn-fc ... imon-kuper" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
One freezing night this January, I was sitting in the Camp Nou with a Barcelona official, watching Barca-Atletico Madrid in the Spanish Cup. When the game kicked off, the official said, "Watch Messi."
It was a puzzling sight. The little man was wandering around, apparently ignoring the ball. The official explained: "In the first few minutes he just walks across the field. He is looking at each opponent, where the guy positions himself, and how their defense fits together. Only after doing that does he start to play."
The stats tell the story. Messi has never scored in the first two minutes of a match. All his 442 goals for club and country came after that. Moreover, his career haul for the third and fourth minutes combined is a meager three strikes. Admittedly the opening minutes of most matches are pretty closed. However, Messi in this period is scoring at less than one-sixth of his normal rate. Instead, he spends the time doing an on-field analysis.
This points to a truth that we often miss amid the frenzy of top-class soccer: It's a thinking game, much less spontaneous than it looks. Even apparently instinctive creators and goal scorers like Messi are forever making calculations, often very conscious ones. To understand today's soccer, you need to grasp these conscious thought processes.
We are getting used to the idea that defensive players tend to move around in patterns dictated by their coaches, almost like in American gridiron football. This is becoming truer as soccer clubs employ growing tribes of video and match analysts to study opponents.
The consequence is that players for big teams now enter matches thoroughly briefed on what to do. Months before the World Cup in Brazil began, every man in the German squad had access to an app on which the team's many analysts would post useful videos. Before the France-Germany quarterfinal, the analysts emphasized one video in particular: an apparently unremarkable scene of the Dutchman Daley Blind tracking his opponent in a Holland-Germany under-21s match in 2013.
You watch the video and forget it almost instantly: The German attack peters out, with the Dutch keeper easily picking up a low pass. But that's because Blind was doing something crucial: After two German players attempted a one-two pass, he didn't follow the ball but kept running with the German who had started the move, staying with him until the attack was dead.
It was exactly the right thing to do. The German analysts expected Blind's defensive ploy to be especially important against the French, whose soccer culture traditionally favors one-twos. The German players studied Blind, and then did as he did. They shut out the previously impressive French 1-0.
Before the semifinal against Brazil and the final against Argentina -- two other countries that like one-twos -- the players watched the Blind video again. When the German FA's chief data analyst Chris Clemens told this story to the Dutch journalist Michiel de Hoog, he even suggested a headline for his article: "How Daley Blind saved Germany's World Cup."
That's the pre-planned nature of modern defending. But for creative players, planning and thinking work rather differently. You can't tell them how to beat a man. However, the best ones, like Messi, do the thinking for themselves. Even when surrounded by opponents in high-speed situations when a normal person would have to rely entirely on instinct, they think fast enough to process data in their minds.
In 2004, Carlos Queiroz, then coach of Real Madrid's Galacticos, told the author John Carlin how great players see on-field situations. "Imagine two cars colliding. For us it happens at normal speed," Queiroz said. "They see it in slow motion. They catch a lot more details in the same time as us. They can compute in their minds more details than you and I can see.
"Therefore they have more time than others. The great ones see the game in slow motion, but really it is in normal time."
If you can see the field, you can see the openings. The longtime director of AC Milan's "Milan Lab," the Belgian doctor Jean Paul Meersseman, told me that this quality of "sensory perception," "interpreting detail inside the brain," may be the most important in soccer. It matters more than any physical gifts. When I asked Meersseman who had it, he named the Brazilian Ronaldo: "He can perceive situations so fast and react to it, it's just amazing."
In part, great players can do this because they have imagined the situation long before it happens. This is the psychological technique of visualization. Look at how Diego Maradona, in his autobiography, describes his famous dribbled goal against England in 1986. He starts by saying, "The goal was a kid's dream." In other words, he had visualized it for years in advance.
Then, even while he was dribbling through half the England team, he was watching his teammate Jorge Valdano make a run to the far post. Maradona kept meaning to pass to him, but the moment was never quite right, and in the end he found that he had beaten everyone including the keeper, so he just scored. In short: In his mind, things were happening so slowly that he could keep one eye on Valdano.
Lastly, at some point after the goal Maradona recalled something his brother Hugo, nicknamed "El Turco," or "The Turk," had told him after a game in 1981, when Maradona had dribbled through the Scotland team but then shot against the keeper. "Idiot!" El Turco had chided him over the phone. He told Maradona he ought to have dribbled around the keeper. Five years later against England, that piece of advice was lodged somewhere in Maradona's brain, ready for use.
Wayne Rooney -- often wrongly derided as not the smartest person -- consciously visualizes. "Part of my preparation," he told the writer David Winner for ESPN The Magazine in 2012, "is I go and ask the kit man what colour we're wearing, if it's red top, white shorts, white socks or black socks. Then I lie in bed the night before the game and visualize myself scoring goals or doing well. You're trying to put yourself in that moment and trying to prepare yourself, to have a 'memory' before the game. I don't know if you'd call it visualizing or dreaming but I've always done it, my whole life."
The best players tend to have an exceptional visual memory. That enables Messi to store his observations about opposing defenders. Schalke 04's Dutch center-forward Klaas Jan Huntelaar, whom Louis van Gaal once called "the best striker in the world in the 'sixteen,'" that is, in the penalty area, can describe in exquisite detail opponents' positions on goals he scored years before. Huntelaar told me he usually didn't shoot on instinct. "The moment when I shoot, I reason through my position." Sometimes he will have observed that a keeper is weaker going to one side, or that a defender is easier to beat on his right than his left. All that information will go into Huntelaar's shot. When I remarked that it sounded as if he had his own personal GPS system, he joked: "Yes, it's in the back of my head."
What players like Huntelaar are doing is conscious but almost impossibly rapid decision-making. If you are a player in scoring position in a big game, teammates and opponents are moving in different directions around you. You have to estimate where everyone will be in 0.1 seconds from now, and then again in one second, make your decision accordingly, and then execute it in a tiny space with almost no margin for error.
It's like a combination of chess and NASCAR racing. If great players make their decisions look instinctive, that's only because their pace of thought is so rapid. Rooney said to Winner: "After the game, mentally you're tired as well. Your mind has been through so much. There's so many decisions you have to make through your head, and then you're trying to calculate other people's decisions as well. It's probably more mentally tiring than physically, to be honest."
Messi and Rooney are not scintillating conversationalists. But appearances deceive. In truth they are among the sharpest thinkers around.
BRON/ http://www.espn.com/soccer/blog/espn-fc ... imon-kuper" onclick="window.open(this.href);return false;
Re: Tactieken en systemen
Eentje om dit oudere topic wat nieuw leven in te blazen.
Een video over de manier van voetballen van Fluminense in Brazilië.
Ze hanteren een groot aantal van de huidige ideeën zoals het spel domineren met balbezit en gegenpressing na balverlies. Maar de manier waarop ze voetballen is toch anders dat wat we zien bij Europese coaches.
Een stijl waarin Ganso, ex-ploegmaat van Neymar bij Santos en misschien wel de allerlaatste klassieke nummer 10, zijn topniveau haalt. Iets wat hem nooit gelukt is in het Europese positional-play van Sampaoli bij Sevilla destijds.
Een video over de manier van voetballen van Fluminense in Brazilië.
Ze hanteren een groot aantal van de huidige ideeën zoals het spel domineren met balbezit en gegenpressing na balverlies. Maar de manier waarop ze voetballen is toch anders dat wat we zien bij Europese coaches.
Een stijl waarin Ganso, ex-ploegmaat van Neymar bij Santos en misschien wel de allerlaatste klassieke nummer 10, zijn topniveau haalt. Iets wat hem nooit gelukt is in het Europese positional-play van Sampaoli bij Sevilla destijds.
Re: Tactieken en systemen
Ga ik later eens deftig bekijken.Sanders schreef: ↑18 mei 2023, 08:34 Eentje om dit oudere topic wat nieuw leven in te blazen.
Een video over de manier van voetballen van Fluminense in Brazilië.
Ze hanteren een groot aantal van de huidige ideeën zoals het spel domineren met balbezit en gegenpressing na balverlies. Maar de manier waarop ze voetballen is toch anders dat wat we zien bij Europese coaches.
Een stijl waarin Ganso, ex-ploegmaat van Neymar bij Santos en misschien wel de allerlaatste klassieke nummer 10, zijn topniveau haalt. Iets wat hem nooit gelukt is in het Europese positional-play van Sampaoli bij Sevilla destijds.
Re: Tactieken en systemen
Interessante video die ik vond over waarom het lijkt dat voetbal op het hoogste niveau trager (gemakkelijker) lijkt dan op amateur niveau.
In de video wordt dit goed uitgelegd en het belang van druk zetten en hoe het uitgevoerd wordt op amateur- en profniveau.
Misschien was Deila wel slimmer dan ons allemaal, liet hij de bal bewust aan de tegenstander om dan erop te springen als een bepaalde trigger zich voordeed.
Jammer dat onze druk voorwaarts vaak onsamenhangend was, of voor gaten zorgde centraal op het middenveld; en dat we uiteindelijk zelfs zo vaak afwachtten dat we passief werden en een doelpunt slikten.
Alleszins een interessante video. Toen ik jonger was en op tv matchen keek zei ik ook dikwijls dat het gemakkelijker voetballen was voor die mannen dan voor ons.
In de video wordt dit goed uitgelegd en het belang van druk zetten en hoe het uitgevoerd wordt op amateur- en profniveau.
Misschien was Deila wel slimmer dan ons allemaal, liet hij de bal bewust aan de tegenstander om dan erop te springen als een bepaalde trigger zich voordeed.
Jammer dat onze druk voorwaarts vaak onsamenhangend was, of voor gaten zorgde centraal op het middenveld; en dat we uiteindelijk zelfs zo vaak afwachtten dat we passief werden en een doelpunt slikten.
Alleszins een interessante video. Toen ik jonger was en op tv matchen keek zei ik ook dikwijls dat het gemakkelijker voetballen was voor die mannen dan voor ons.